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T h e " G r e a t W a r " L e tters: Im a g in a tio n an d T ru th
All of the "G reat W ar" letters have not survived. Most
of those that have survived were written by Lewis and
preserved by Barfield.15
In w hat must be one of the first surviving letters Lewis
began in his typical manner by distinguishing two uses for
the term "truth." On the one hand, he said, it can be an
object or fact; on the other, it can be the "mental complex"
related to that fact. " I say a complex because when we
know, we always know that, etc. (an accusative with the
infinitive)..." N otice that from the very beginning Lewis
has limited truth to propositional statements that we can
"know ." To be even more specific, he usually spoke of
truth in terms of a true-false statement (whether a certain
statement is true or false). W e cannot say that emotions or
bodies are true or false, because the concept does not apply
to the things themselves. We can only say whether a
certain statement about them is true or false.
The question at hand was whether or not the truthfalsehood concept could be applied to Imagination. Of
course, Lewis said, it does not apply to "ordinary
imagination," the mere "image-m akingfaculty." Ordinary
images merely invented by conscious effort cannot beTrue
in any sense of the term. But what about poetic
imagination (i.e. Imagination as experienced by both
Lewis and Barfield, and as described in the Surmna)? Lewis
pointed out that both he and Barfield had experienced the
images appearing after poetic imagination "ebbs." And
those images cannot be different from ordinary images;
like them, they are not in that class of things about which
we can use the word Truth. Lewis did suggest, however,
that Truth might pertain to some imageless state of
Imagination "w herein the light of sense goes out."
Furthermore, and more importantly for Lewis' view of
knowledge, any "sediment" of explicit assertion left with the
sediment of images could not be true-or-false either. Even if
the assertion is true, it could not be the same truth as seen in
poetic imagination; otherwise, how does poetic imagination
differ from normal judgement? He likened "the crossing of
the frontier" between the inspired and uninspired states to
the blurring that takes place "when you change the focus of
your telescope." Summing up his argument so far, Lewis
said, "Granting the truth of poetical imagination, we can
never argue from it to the truth of any judgement which
springs up in the mind as it returns to normal consciousness."

Therefore, Lewis asserted, 1) even if we are sure that
we know in poetic im agination, we can't be sure of what
w e know, and 2) poetic imagination is not in the class of
things to which True-False can be applied. Lewis hastened
to add, however, that he did not deny value to poetic
imagination merely because it does not have the kind of
Truth he had been talking about. Morality and Beauty do
not have Truth in that sense, either. He quoted Sidney to
the effect that poets do not lie, because they never assert.
Barfield's answer has fortunately been preserved.
Indeed, it is in this letter that he m ost clearly showed the
difference between his thought and Lewis'. First of all,
Barfield refused to accept Lewis' limited definition of the
term "Truth." 'T ru th to you... is something you look at...
while reality is something you are b ut never see," he said.
Barfield did not define Truth as an "accurate copy or
reflection" of reality, but as reality itself "taking the form
of human consciousness." Secondly, he used an argument
we might call m etaphysical since it was based on his view
of the soul's evolution from Spirit. In it he drew a diagram
to explain how "Inspiration, or 'supersensible"
experience, lig h t of sense going out,' etc., is a sort of
withdrawal from A into that-which-is-in-process-ofbecoming A, wherein I find that I am also in (i.e. become
one with) that-which-is-in-process-of-becoming B." There
is a similar argument in Barfield's Replicit to Lewis' Summa
in which he attacked Lewis' use of the enjoyment/
contemplation distinction. There he pointed out that
Imagination could be called "con-enjoym ent", since it
involves moving back toward Spirit from pure soulhood.
In both the letter and the later Replicit the inference is plain.
Inspiration or "con-enjoym ent" must mean seeing Truth
from Spirit's perspective.
Third, Barfield considered the logical process itself to
be inadequate to deal with reality. Since terms change their
meaning when passing through time or between people,
a term is an "arbitrary cross-section of the process taldng
place in tim e." Terms must be "artificially taken out of
time" to be used, while reality continues to change, he said.
Therefore, since most sentences are both true and untrue,
logical statements cannot truly be a vehicle of anything
worthy of the name of knowledge or truth. In other words,
Barfield thought a limiting of Truth to the logical sphere
alone (as Lewis did) was not only inadequate, but ques
tioned whether the terms knowledge or truth could be
applied to the logical sphere at all. Restating the argument

CPyTHLORC

Issue 65 - SpRing 1991

from his thesis, Barfield noted that terms "perpetually tend
to lose their meaning and become tautologous," but could
recover their meaning "at the fount of inspiration, flowing
through imagination." In fact, as w e saw earlier, Barfield
claimed that inspiration and imagination are required
intermediate steps betw een reality and terms, or between
reality and metaphor.
Barfield agreed with Lewis that one can't argue from
the truth of poetical im agination to the truth of any
judgment that remains in the mind when it has returned
to normal consciousness. However, Barfield believed that
Anthroposophical training could overcome this problem,
allowing the poet to retain fully the judgm ent he had in
normal consciousness throughout an experience of poetic
imagination. H e again pointed Lewis toward Steiner's
"systematic imagination" which could train the mind to
observe its ow n activity. The underlying spiritual reality
is not truth actual, Barfield said, but only truth potential,
needing the Imagination to act upon it first.
Barfield had insisted in his thesis that the poet creates
or re-creates primary meaning through the use of
metaphor. "The progress is from Meaning [notice the
capital] through inspiration to imagination, and from
imagination through metaphor, to meaning" (PD, 141).
Lewis seized Barfield's emphasis on m eaning and
developed a distinction that he was never later to deny.
First, Lewis asked the question whether "knowledge"
is a what or a that. H e wished to distinguish between two
different kinds of knowledge, the knowledge what
something is like and the knowledge that something exists
in fact. Since Barfield had also denied the truth of bald
statements made after poetic imagination was over, Lewis
thought they both agreed that metaphor may develop a
what (in the hearer), but not demonstrate a that. Two
people can share what something may be like by
imagination, but disagree as to whether that "whatness"
represents actual reality. W ith that, Lewis dropped the
term "know ledge" alm ost completely. He preferred to
distinguish between "m eaning" (what something is like)
and "truth" (whether something exists).16
To imagine what a statement would mean no more
vouches for its validity than rival hypotheses in the mind
of the scientist. Nothing can be either true or false unless
it first means something; but to know what something
means does not help one to know whether it is true or false.
Metaphor can be used in prose arguments, as well. But
even a good metaphor can only show the meaning in a
point of view; it cannot show it to be well-founded. There
fore, poetic imagination can give meaning to a proposition
(what it would mean, if true), but does not tell if it is true.
Lewis and Barfield continued to differ over the essen
tial nature of truth and metaphor. Lewis denied the use of
the term "truth" for the kind of knowledge that Barfield
insisted Imagination (and metaphor) revealed. But he did
accept the term "m eaning" for that kind of knowledge.
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Barfield, however, wished to maintain that Imagination
produces Truth, and ultimately could lead to both meaning
and true statements; that Anthroposophical training could
lead to true propositional statements about the reality seen
in moments of poetic imagination or inspiration.
We have seen how Lewis' high view of Imagination as
Spiritual Awareness in Part II of the Summa was firmly based
on his view of Being in Part I. We began our examination of
the "Great W ar" letters because they clarified the serious
clash which appears at the end of the Summa between Lewis'
concept of Imagination and his concept of epistemology. We
now can see the broad movement of Lewis' thought as the
"Great W ar" progressed. The debate began over Barfield's
epistemology ("how we know"), which had been based on
Steiner's Anthroposophy. Lewis continued to argue against
this view, strengthened by Alexander's enjoyment/contemplation distinction, while at the same time coming to accept
both Barfield's view of metaphysics (man's Being as a soul
emerging from Spirit of which it is a part) and Barfield's high
Coleridgean view of Imagination!
Let us look at the main arguments of the Summa. In
brief summary, Lewis proposed:
1. The soul emerges from Spirit, of which it is a part.
The world of Nature also emerges from Spirit, and
therefore "is the creation o f w hat I, at some level, am."
2. W e cannot both enjoy and contemplate at the same
time, for the Spirit is the contemplating self and the soul is
the enjoying self.
3. But we can, by Imagination, "see all things as Spirit
sees," and "w ill all things as Spirit w ills," and this is our
ideal function as souls. Imagination, like all modes of the
spiritual life, is a Spiritual Awareness or consciousness of
one's participation in Spirit and (therefore) in all that
seems external to us.
4. However, since we cannot both enjoy Imaginative
experience and contemplate w hether it is true at the same
time, knowledge of truth or falsehood m ust be objectively
demonstrated. The m ost we can say is that Imagination
conveys the "meaning" or concrete "w hatness" of
something, but it cannot tells us "that" such is factually
true or exists.
5. Therefore, although we can get meaning, we cannot
get truth by Imagination alone.
Barfield accurately observed that points #1 (Lew is''
view of Being) and #3 (his view of Imagination)
contradicted point #2, suggesting that the enjoyment/
contemplation distinction presented there was wrong.
Eventually, however, Lewis denied points #1 and #3
instead! In my earlier paper (see Note 6 in Part I of this article),
Lewis' denial of the view of Being presented in Part I of his
Summa was emphasized. In the rest of this article, we will
examine Lewis' eventual denial of the high view of Im
agination he had presented in Part II.

Page 18

Issue 65 - Spning 1991

L e w is P o s t-C o n v e rs io n : Im a g in a tio n in th e P sy ch e
After his conversion, Lewis' philosophy changed radi
cally. The first indications of this change appeared in his
later annotations to the Sutnma. These annotations must
have been w ritten in 1930 or, at the latest, early in 1931.
These later notes provide evidence for the early develop
ment (shortly after his conversion to Theism) of Lewis' new
concepts of Creation and the Incarnation. But they also
show the beginnings of a new view of imagination as well.
In his Summa the conception of the relationship
betw een artistic creation and the creation of the world had
been very similar to that of Coleridge. He had originally
written, 'T h e analogy between cosmic and artistic creation
is more than analogy, the latter being simply the lowest
grade of the form er" (Part I, Sec.x). The later annotation to
this was "NEGO , it is an imperfect analogy." Another
annotation commented further, "The whole difference
betw een an artist's creation (and pre-existing mind) and
real cosmic creation is neglected."17 In other words, Lewis
was beginning to see a difference in kind between creation
by God and "creation" by an artist via imagination.
This distinction became a major part of Lewis' post
conversion view of imagination. Unlike Barfield and
Coleridge, then, Lewis believed that artists imitate reality;
they do not create it. Indeed, in his early essay, "Chris
tianity and Literature," Lewis insisted that only such
words as "im itation" or "reflection" correctly describe the
artist's work. "A n author should never conceive himself
as bringing into existence beauty or wisdom which did not
exist before, but simply and solely as trying to embody in
terms of his own art some reflection of eternal Beauty and
W isdom " (CP, 5-7).
A year later in 1940 Lewis published a related essay,
titled "Christianity and Culture." O f crucial importance
for his new view of imagination, this essay marked the first
appearance in print of Lew is' contention that the soul and
spirit are not the same. Lewis actually wrote "Christianity
and Culture" in response to an article by George Every in
the March 1939 issue of Theology. Brother Every had
appeared to suggest that "culture" and "good taste" in
literature were spiritual values. Lewis claimed to be
appalled. "M y fear was lest excellence in reading and
writing were being elevated into a spiritual value" (CR,
28). H e responded to Every by making his crucial distinc
tion between the soul and the spirit of man. "W e should
be cured at the outset of our inveterate confusion between
psyche and pneuma, nature and supemature" (CR, 13).
Using this distinction between soul and spirit, he denied
that cultural things were spiritual. "Culture is a storehouse
of the best (sub-Christian) values. These values are in
themselves of the soul, not the spirit. But God created the
soul. Its values may be expected, therefore, to contain some
reflection or antepast of the spiritual values" (CR, 23).
This, then, was his clearest statement of the new place
imagination was to have in his post-conversion thought.
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Imagination no longer remained the highest form of the
spiritual life, no longer could be called Spiritual Aware
ness. Rather, imagination (small "i") had become a lower
faculty, able to reflect spiritual values, but not "spiritual"
itself. Lewis consistently maintained this in all his
subsequent writings. For example, late in his life he
explained his view thus, " I think that all things, in their
way, reflect heavenly truths, the imagination not least.
'Reflect' is the im portant word. This lower life of the
imagination is not a beginning, nor a step toward the
higher life of the spirit, m erely an im age" (ShJ, 167).
This was based, o f course, on his acceptance of a true
creation of man as other than God, and his distinction
between the soul and spirit of man. Prior to his conversion
he had talked of the individual man's soul emerging from
the universal Spirit. But after his conversion Lewis firmly
believed man to consist of three parts — body, soul and
spirit, all three being creations of God. (See Note 10.)
And Lewis placed the imagination of man in the realm
of the soul, not the spirit.18 In fact, Lewis believed that the
soul had its own subjective or psychological "w orld", the
immaterial world of emotions, passions, memory, and
imagination. In his Allegory o f Love he studied the
descriptions of this "w orld" that are found in medieval
allegory, first in straight allegorical personifications, but
later in a new and subtler way. He pointed to the rise from
within the allegorical love poems of "som ething else"
which "lurks at the back of most romantic poetry. I mean
the 'other world' not of religion, but of imagination" (AoL,
75). "W e are apt," he said, "to take for granted that a poet
has at his command, besides the actual world and the
world of his own religion, a third world o f m yth and fancy
(AoL, 82). It is clear, then, that even shortly after his
conversion, (The Allegory o f Love was published in 1936)
Lewis was beginning to distinguish the world of the
imagination from the spiritual realm.
This distinction can actually be seen developing in
Lewis' mind during his long controversy with E.M.W.
Tillyard over "The Personal Heresy." Although the essays
were eventually collected in book form in 1939, Lewis' first
essay was written during the later stages of the "Great
W ar" and presented to the Martlets in March 1930. The fact
of relevance to this discussion is that Lew is' description of
poetry in this first essay differs considerably from the one
in his last (fifth) essay, written many years later. Lewis
pointed this out himself in a note appended to the book
form of the essays:
In the First we are told that the poet puts together 'scraps
of ordinary seeing' in such a way as to produce a new
mode of consciousness. This new mode sees objects more
'synthetically', and with a 'vaster context' than we usually
attain. It is described as being 'racial'; and a subject who
enjoyed it habitually would be superhuman. In the Fifth
Essay poetry consists in a special use of language which
exploits its extra-logical properties so as to convey the
concrete. (PH, 146)
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Lewis tried to unify the two seemingly unrelated concepts
by observing that the first deals with "the poetic process
('seeing' and 'saying')" while the second deals with "the
poetic object or content (the thing 'seen' and 'said')."
But he realized he could not remove a major inconsis
tency regarding the essential nature of poetic imagination.
In the first essay the poetic consciousness had been
identified with either "racial" or "angelic" consciousness,
while in the last essay it was considered to be on a "much
lower plane" — seemingly limited to merely conveying
the concrete reality of experiences that are common to all
men.
To speak more plainly, I have assumed (i) what now seems
tome very unlikely, that large groups of human individuals
possess a common consciousness; and (ii) that if they do,
this common consciousness would be so superior to that
of the individuals that it might be called 'angelic'. In fact,
1 have exaggerated. (PH,147, italics added)
He went on to admit that he only hacTa "right" to say that
poets use "memories, associations, and values" that are
widely distributed among all men, rejecting w hatis "mere
ly idiosyncratic." No human being, of course, constantly
"enjoys" poetic imagination.
W ith our knowledge of the "G reat W ar," we can see
that the first essay represented more of the pre-Christian
views of the Summa and the last essay more of Lewis'
mature Christian thought. The "common consciousness"
of man can only refer to his former view that all souls are
essentially one in Spirit. In addition, the quotation
provides further evidence that Lewis had accepted for a
time Barfield's contention that poetic imagination involves
the soul's "ascent" back toward Spirit, i.e. the poet ex
periencing poetic imagination essentially occupies a posi
tion in between universal Spirit and individual soul. By the
time these essays were published in book form, however,
Lewis realized that he no longer held those beliefs.
Lewis' contributions to The Personal Heresy are full of
concepts he had developed during his "G reat W ar" with
Barfield. In fact, the main contention of the titular essay is
based on the enjoyment/ contemplation distinction— that
readers should not try to mix "imaginative apprehension"
of a poem or drama with "unpoetic reflection" about the
poet himself.
To see things as the poet sees them I must share his
consciousness and not attend to it: I must look where he
looks and not turn round to face him: I must make of him
not a spectacle but a pair of spectacles: in fine, as Professor
Alexander would say, I must enjoy him and not con
template him. (PH, 12)
Of equal importance was Lewis' continued assertion that
meaning and truth must be distinguished. A poem may
tell us what a certain person in a certain situation is like, he
said, but not that that the poet himself is like that, or even
if such a person actually exists at all.
Unlike his later rejection of a "racial" consciousness,
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though, Lewis never rejected this last concept. It is explicit
ly supported in the fifth essay. For example, he defined
poetic language there as language used "to convey the
concrete reality of experience" (PH, 108). To support this
further, Lewis claimed that whatever is concrete is real,
"i.e. a real something, though not necessarily the thing it
pretends to be: e.g. what pretends to be a crocodile may be
a (real) dream; what pretends at the breakfast-table to be a
dream may be a (real) lie." Therefore, poetry does not tell
us whether the particular things she describes actually
exist; poetry "answ ers the question What", while science
"answers the question Whether." Lewis ended his last
essay in the controversy b y proposing that the value of
poetry resides 1) in its being enjoyable, interesting and
attractive, and 2) in its ability to help or hinder us toward
all the other things that w e would like to do (PH, 119-120).
This emphasis on what a poem does to the readers was
to remain prominent in Lewis' criticism, eventually
providing the stimulus for his much later work, An
Experiment in Criticism. Even a casual reading would reveal
that the view of literature expressed in the later book is
little different from that expressed earlier. Here again is an
emphasis on the reader sharing the author's consciousness
(or using his "spectacles" or looking through his "w in
dow ") in order to view something else (EC, 137-139). Here
is a similar emphasis on the "w hatness" of the author's
experience, whether it is true historically or not. "W hat
matters is his power to make us live it" (EC, 139). It is not
a question of knowing that at all. If it is "know ing", it is
connaitre ("knowledge by acquaintance"), not savoir
("knowledge that"). W e may "know " (connaitre) many
things that do not exist, he said, because we have met them
in great literature. "M y own eyes are not enough for me, I
will see through those of others. Reality, even seen through
the eyes of many, is not enough. I will see what others have
invented" (EC, 140).
W hat then, Lewis asked, is the good of "occupying our
hearts" with stories that never happened or "entering
vicariously" into feelings that would be immoral to
harbour in ourselves? "The nearest that I have yet got to
an answer is that we seek an enlargement of our being. We
want to be more than ourselves" (EC, 137). In the following
pages Lewis proceeded to resurrect his earlier concept of
imagination as a "multiplying of consciousness." But this
was no longer the consciousness of Spirit but of the in
dividual soul of man. N or was this multiplying of
consciousness to add "richness to the life of Spirit," but to
add richness to the life of each individual man:
Each of us by nature sees the whole world from one point
of view with a perspective and a selectiveness peculiar to
himself... We want to see with other eyes, to imagine with
other imaginations, to feel with other hearts, as well as
with our own.
A little further on, he used another concept from the
Summa, but again in a new way. "Obviously this process
can be d escribed eith er as an en largem en t or as a
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temporary annihilation of the self. But that is an old
paradox; Tie that loseth his life shall save it"' (EC, 138).
Lewis well understood, and in some sense shared, the
sensibility of the English Romantics — that alienation of
man from the world of Nature, and of man from man. For
awhile Lewis had accepted a view of soul and Spirit that
overcame that alienation philosophically, and seemed to
give him a metaphysical base for what happened to him
experientially during moments of imagination. He later
rejected the m etaphysical base, but could not reject w hat
he had experienced from imaginative literature. Although
modified and less pretentious, his post-conversion view of
im agination still allowed him many of the benefits of his
old view. Imaginative experience in literature, he said:
heals the wound, without undermining the privilege, of
individuality... In reading great literature I become a
thousand men and yet remain myself. Like the night sky
in the Greek poem, I see with a myriad eyes, but it is still
I who see. Here, as in worship, in love, in moral action,
and in knowing, I transcend myself; and am never more
myself than when I do. (EC, 140-141)
Ultimately then, if im agination did not keep its former
status as the highest form of the spiritual life, it did retain
a very high position indeed in Lew is' view of literature.
But Lewis did not limit the value of literature to its
particular intrinsic goodness as an "expansion of being,"
There was another "good" possible as well. For that, we
m ust now return to Lew is' essay, "Christianity and Cul
ture." Lewis had begun on a biographical note. "A t an early
age I came to believe that the life of culture (that is, of
intellectual and aesthetic activity) was very good for its own
sake, or even that it was good for man." He went on:
After my conversion I continued to hold this belief
without consciously asking how it could be reconciled
with my new belief that the end of human life was salva
tion in Christ and the glorifying of God. I was awakened
from this confused state of mind by finding that the
friends of culture seemed to me to be exaggerating. (CR,

12)

It is interesting to observe the term "exaggeration" used
exactly as he had used it in his added Note to The Personal
Heresy. They were written only a year apart, of course.
Lew is w as convinced that his former view of poetic
im agination was not completely wrong; only that it had
claimed too much.
The first half of "Christianity and Culture" dealt with
his search to find a Christian sanction for the pursuit of
culture — in his own case, literary culture. He concluded
by saying:
My researches left me with the impression that there
could be no question of restoring to culture the kind of
status which I had given it before my conversion. If any
constructive case for culture was to be built up it would
have to be of a much humbler kind... (CR, 19)
Lewis then attempted to build a "case for culture." He
sought an ethical reason for engaging in cultural or literary
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activity, one that w ould be consistent with his Christian
beliefs. He had begun the essay by denying a higher
"spiritual" value to cultural activities. "The work of a
charwoman and the work of a poet become spiritual in the
same way and on the same condition... Let us stop giving
ourselves airs." He described the value of culture more
humbly: Although not spiritual in themselves, cultural or
literary activities may well be a road toward the spiritual.
He pointed to his own conversion as an example of the
best one could hope for from cultural pursuit. Lewis
believed that his experiences of Joy or "Romantic
Sehnsuchf' were crucial to his conversion. "W ithout them
my conversion would have been more difficult," he said
in the essay. While such experiences m ay well lead in the
opposite direction (and often has, he observed), for some
it will lead them to Christ and Christianity. The best
experiences and values of literature m ay be "subChristian", but they reflect or imitate spiritual ones.
"Though 'like is not the same', it is better than unlike.
Imitation may pass into initiation. For some it is a good
beginning," he said (CR, 23).
Both of Lewis' autobiographies, The Pilgrim's Regress
and Surprised by Joy, were written to show how the ex
perience of Sehnsucht or Desire or Joy provided just such a
"good beginning." H e even sub-titled the first, An
Allegorical Apology for Qiristianity, Reason and Romanticism.
Camell has pointed out that Lewis' (final) concept of Joy
or Sehnsucht was a much humbler variety than the Roman
tics usually claimed. He accurately observed that Lewis'
view "can destroy Romanticism only for those who have
enthroned it as God. Its proper validity as a way
remains."20 Although Lewis said in Surprised by Joy, "This
lower life of the imagination is not a beginning of, nor a
step toward, the higher life of the spirit," he also added a
footnote: "i.e. not necessarily and by its own nature. God
can cause it to be such a beginning" (SbJ, 167).
W e may summarize the article in this way. There were
two parts to Lewis' m ove aw ay from his views of the
Summa toward his post-conversion views. First, Lewis
moved the Spirit of man from its position as God to being
a part of creation m ade by God; capitalized Spirit became
a small spirit. Second, and based on the first, Lewis moved
imagination from the realm of "Spirit" to the psyche;
capitalized Imagination became small imagination. For he
ended up believing imagination to be psychological, not
spiritual — however it may be defined. Imagination
became for Lewis neither "Spiritual" in the sense of
"seeing as Spirit sees" (no longer an option in his new view
of man's Being), nor spiritual in the religious sense (he
placed man's Reason and Conscience, but not his imagina
tion, in the created spirit of man). However, Lewis did
leave room for imagination to be a way toward the spiritual
in the religious sense — if God used it in such a way.
¥
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Notes
15. All quotes from the "Great War" materials in this artide are from
previously published excerpts. Unless stated otherwise, they appear
either in my article, "Knowing and Being in CS. Lewis’ 'Great War'
with Owen Barfield," CSL: The Bulletin of the New York CS. Lewis
Society, 169 (Nov.1983), 1-8; or in Lionel Adey’s book, C.S.Lewis's
"Great War" with Owen Barfield English Literary Studies
Monograph Series 14 (Victoria, B.C.: University of Victoria, 1978). My
own tentative chronology would differ from that of Adey's in his
monograph.
16. Duringthe "GreatWar," Lewis used the terms "meaning" and "truth."
He would continue to use these two terms throughout most of his
life. However, the terms were not theimportant thing. The important
concept was the distinction between the "whatness" or "concrete
ness" or "quiddity" of things and the statements "that" such things
existed. During the "Great War," he called this "whatness" by the
term meaning, and "thatness" by the term truth. Elsewhere, he used
reality for the "whatness" and truth again for the "thatness" (GiD,
66-67). Once, in The Pilgrim's Regress, he used the terms truth and
image for the "whatness" and the terms fact and very real for the
"thatness" (PR,170). This is only confusing if one does not see that in
The Pilgrim's Regress, Lewis was in some sense distinguishing "truth"
and "fact." The important distinction is the same, between the mean
ing and the fact of existence.
17. Quoted in my letter, "A Reply [to Lionel Adey]." CSL: The Bulletin of
the New York C.S. Lewis Society, 173 (March 1984), 10-11.
18. For examples, see Appendix A to Lewis' Miracles, pp. 175-176, and his
Screwtape Letters, pp. 36-37.
19. Seeasimilar discussion of savoir and conna/trein Lewis'"DeAudiendis
Poetis," (SMRL, 11).
20. Corbin S. Camell, Bright Shadow of Reality: C.S. Lewis and the Feeling
Intellect (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974) 148.
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CUaR a n d O u r PR ioR iries
continued from page 4
To be able accept this invitation is a supreme honor,
whether the duration is — as for the m ayfly— a day, or for
those fortunate few, a century. The duration is a minor
consideration, almost an irrelevance, compared with the
richness of the invitation itself. Yet in the end, the party for
each individual must end, and we must come to terms with
the fact that eventually it will be time to leave. C.S. Lewis'
grave is inscribed with the quote from Sheakespeare: "Men
must endure their going hence." The tragedy is not that the
party must end, but that so many do not recognize that it
is a party at all! They become distracted by the annoyances
and hardships of life. It is as if they have gone to the verdant
countryside in May to have a picnic, and then complain that
there are some ants present, or that a crow is in the trees, or
that they didn't bring all the right drinks. They ignore the
glorious weather, the flowers in bloom, the fresh breeze, the
presence of good friends. W e all pay too much attention to
the ants sometimes, which in fact can bite, instead of look
ing at the flowers and feeling the breeze.
For many of us, faith gives us the hope that beyond the
end of this "party" there is something more and better. And
in this light, the invitation to life holds concealed w ithin it
a second invitation to an unending celebration where the
good that was merely inferred here will become reality
with a diamond-like solidity.
Lewis in The Great Divorce and Tolkien in his unique
classic "Leaf by Niggle" — along with scatterings in
Williams — give us w hat they sense this may be like. This
affirmation is the key ingredient to Joy; it gives the valida
tion and focus to what our very desires point to. Whether
or not this life is the final word is up to the choice of the
individual to accept this second invitation. Despite war,
injustice, and death, those who can see beyond to share the
Inklings' vision, can repeat with the same gratitude what
Niggle said: "It's a gift!"
------

Glen GoodKnight

